Blackmore v. Re/Max Tri-Cities, LLC Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 36189 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-26-2009
Blackmore v. Re/Max Tri-Cities, LLC Appellant's
Reply Brief Dckt. 36189
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Blackmore v. Re/Max Tri-Cities, LLC Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36189" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 42.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/42
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Rich and Renee Blackmore, husband and 
wife, both individually, and in their 
capacity as natural parents and guardians 
ad litem of Rich Blackmore, a minor child, 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
PAYETTE 
Supreme Court # 36189-2009 
PlaintiffslAppellants, 
v. 
REMAX Tri-Cities, L.L.C., Sue Mio, 
individually, and Brad Thompson, 
individually, 
DefendantslRespondents. 
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1x1. ARGUM.ENT IN REPLY 
A. Introduction. 
Appellants Rich and Renee Blackmore, individually and on behalf of their minor child, 
Rich Blackmore, lodged their opening brief in this matter on June 12, 2009. By way of their 
initial briefing, the Blackmores set forth the argument that the order of Summary Judgment 
below was erroneously granted and that their Motion for Reconsideration below was erroneously 
denied, as there existed (and still exist) genuine issues of material fact with respect to their 
claims for negligence against Respondents ReMax Tri-Cities, L.L.C., Sue Mio, and Brad 
Thompson. The Blackmores thus asked this Court to reverse the order of Summary Judgment, 
and to remand this case so that a jury may resolve the issues of material fact. 
Respondents have since submitted their brief in response to the Blackmores' position on 
appeal. Respondents first contend that they did not violate any duties owed to the Blackmores 
under the "The Idaho Real Estate Brokerage Representation Act" (hereinafter "IBRA"). Idaho 
Code 5 54-2082, et seq. Respondents next contend that IBRA abrogated all common law tort 
duties which might otherwise apply to real estate transactions like the one here. Respondents 
further argue that, even if they did owe some duty to the Blackmores, no error was made in 
summary judgment, as the Blackmores failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact in 
the evidence presented to the district court. 
Before addressing these legal issues, the Blackmores first wish to start by dispensing with 
a few preliminary matters. Along these lines, the Blackmores note how Respondents frequently 
refer to the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement between the Blackmores and Rhineh&s 
and the "As Is" language contained therein, as somehow being dispositive of the legal duties the 
Respondents owed to the Blackmores. It must be pointed out however that the language form 
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the purchase and sale agreement controlled the contractual relationship between buyers 
(Blackmores) and sellers (Rhineharts), but not the relationship between the Blackmores and their 
real estate agents and brokers (Respondents). Suffice it to say, the duties owed between the 
Respodents and the Blackmores as set forth in IBRA are "mandatory" and may not be "waived 
or abrogated, either unilaterally or by agreement." See Idaho Code $ 54-2087(8). Similarly, the 
Respondents make repeated references to the EPA standards governing municipal water systems. 
Yet, the Respondents recognize the "EPA had not promulgated standards for domestic wells" at 
the time of closing. See Respondents' Brief, p. 14. This case involves a domestic well. So in 
reality the EPA standards mean nothing here. On a final preliminary note, the Blackmores take 
strong exception to the representation by Respondents that: "It is undisputed that, at the time the 
Blackmores' purchased the Rhinehart property, the domestic well produced water that was safe 
for human consumption." See Respondents' Brief, pp. 13-14. What is clear from the record is 
the Blackmores' son suffers from a condition relating to the presence of dangerous levels of 
Arsenic in the drinking water. R., Vol, 1, p. 12. 
After having dispensed with the preliminaries, The Blackmores now take the opportunity 
to reply to the substantive issues raised by the Respondents. 
1. Nothing in Idaho Law Precludes the Simultaneous Existence of Duties 
Arising from The Idaho Real Estate Brokerage Representation Act and 
from the Common Law. 
The Blackrnores submit, as they did below, that the duties owed to them by the 
Respondents can be and are grounded not only in Idaho Code $54-2087, but also in the common 
law of negligence under Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980). Respondents 
maintain that IBRA abolished common law tort duties owed to clients by real estate 
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professionals. Respondents' Brief, pp. 24-25. For the reasons set forth below, the Respondents' 
argument is inconsistent with Idaho law speaking to the existence of separate duties arising from 
separate sources. 
The cases and authority cited by Respondents to support their argument that common law 
duties were abrogated by Idaho Code $54-2094 simply do not extend as far as Respondents have 
argued they do. Respondents correctly note that the Blackmores have chosen not Lo argue on 
appeal that Respondents owed and breached "fiduciary duties" to the Blackmores. Idaho Code 9 
54-2094 ("Representation not fiduciary in nature") is fairly clear on that issue, which is why it is 
not now on appeal. However, Respondents have attempted to expand the reach of that Code 
section to also abrogate the common law duty of reasonable care. The plain meaning of the 
Code does no such thing. Instead, the Code very clearly "abrogate[s] the common law of agency 
as it applies to regulated real estate transactions . . .." LC. $ 54-2094 (emphasis added). The 
Code does not however, explicitly or implicitly, say anything relative to its effect on the common 
law of negligence, which is the issue at hand in this appeal. Additionally, the Code states that 
"the duties and obligations owed to a represented client in a regulated real estate transaction are 
not fiduciary in nature and are not subject to equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duty." 
Id, In other words, according to Idaho Code, a plaintiff cannot bring an action against a real 
estate brokerage for breach of fiduciary duty. Again, the Code says nothing of one's ability to 
bring an action for breach of common law duties. The existence of those duties is not limited by 
this section of the Code; instead, only the nature of those duties (i.e. fiduciary or not) is clarified. 
Neither does the case law cited by Respondents expand the plain reading of this 
straightforward statutory language. Taylor v. Maize, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), for 
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example, speaks only to whether the plaintiffs in that action could maintain a cause of action for 
breach of an "assumed fiduciary duty": 
The Taylors are not able to make a claim against Mr. Maile under 
count two for breach of an assumed fiduciary duty because there 
was no allegation of an assumed duty. In any event, the 
Legislature has essentially inoculated real estate brokers against 
such claims by virtue of Idaho Code $ 54-2094." 
Taylor, 142 Idaho at 262. The object of the Court's reference to "such claims" in that context 
applied only to the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty, as there was no prior 
discussion involving common law or statutory duties in the context of that statement. 
Accordingly, and quite contrary to Respondents' assertion, Taylor has no effect on common law 
claims. 
Respondents acknowledge in their brief that the district court failed to recognize the 
difference between the statutory duties and the common law duties owed to the Blackmores: 
"The district court dismissed those [common law] claims as the record failed to establish Mr. 
Thompson breached any statutory duties owed to the Blackmores." Respondents' Brief, p. 24. 
This acknowledgement demonstrates the error of the district court's overly broad and sweeping 
dismissal of Appellants' claims, as Respondents' own cited authority demonstrates that duties 
founded in statute and duties founded in common law can and do exist independently and 
simultaneously, even where a contractual relationship may exist between the parties: "It can also 
be said that if a cause of action for breach of a duty based on a contractual promise could also be 
maintained without the contract by virtue of a statutory or common law duty, then the action is 
founded upon tort, not contract." Sumpter v. Holland Realty, Inc., 140 Idaho 349,354,93 P.3d 
680,685 (2004). See also Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386,34 P.3d 1069 (2001) (analyzing 
the possible existence of several asserted bases for the existence of a legal duty, but not finding 
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that a common law duty did not exist simply because a statute was on point); Hudson v. Cobbs, 
118 Idaho 474, 518, 797 P.2d 1322, 1366 (1990) ("[Aln action in tort requires a showing that 
there is a breach of duty imposed by common law or statute." (emphasis added)). Just as the Udy 
court analyzed statutory and common law claims of negligence separately, so too should have 
the district court in this action. It was reversible error not to. 
2. The Blackmores' Complaint was Pled Sufficiently to Maintain Causes of 
Action for both Common Law and Statutory Negligence. 
Respondents have argued that the Blackmores' allegations were all grounded in the 
relationship governed by Idaho Code 5 54-2087, such that any argument for common law 
negligence outside the scope of statutory negligence would be inapplicable. Respondents' Brief, 
p. 24. However, the allegations in the Blackmores' Verified Complaint were not pled with any 
limiting specificity that would now cabin them into negligence claims regarding only the 
statutory duties provided for in Idaho Code 8 54-2087. Labeled rather generically as 
"Negligence," and without specific citation to the duties identified in LC. 5 54-2087, the 
Blackmores' claim against Respondents was sufficiently and broadly pled to put Respondents on 
notice for breaches of any and all duties that they owed or might have owed to the Blackmores. 
R., Vol. 1, p. 16; C$ I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) (general rules of notice pleading). 
3. Respondents had Statutory Duties of Reasonable Skill and Care. 
It is agreed by all that Respondents had a statutory duty to exercise reasonable skill and 
care. See Idaho Code 8 54-2087(2). The district court concluded however that with respect to 
the duty to exercise reasonable skill and care, the Respondents were entirely insulated by Idaho 
Code 8 54-2087(7). R., Vol. 2., p. 306. Respondents have reasserted this argument on appeal. 
See generally, Respondent's Brief. Idaho Code $54-2087(7) provides: "Unless otherwise aereed 
to in writing, a brokerage and its licensees owe no duty to a client to conduct an independent 
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inspection of the property . . .." (emphasis added). From this statutory provision, Respondents' 
claim that since the Blackmores' request for a full scale water panel test was not reduced to 
writing, it was not enforceable. This argument may have some appeal when viewed in the 
general sense. However, when viewed under the specific facts of this case, its general appeal 
washes away. 
Here, Respondents not only agreed to conduct a fulI panel water test, but also told the 
Blackmores it had been completed and reported the results to the Blackmores by explaining 
everything with the well water was fine. Thus, it may be that Respondents did not have a duty to 
test the water in the first instance, but once done, it most definitely had the duty to provide the 
Blackmores with an accurate and complete account of the type of test performed and the results 
obtained. Clearly here it was not communicated to the Blackmores that a coliform only test was 
performed, rather than the full scale water panel test requested by them. As such, the results 
reported to the Blackmores about how the water was fine was misleading to the Blackmores 
because the Blackmores were not notified that the scope of the water test was for colifom only. 
Under these circumstances, the Respondents should not be able to hide behind Idaho Code $ 54- 
2087(7), especially when considering it was the Respondents' obligation to advise the 
Blackmores in the first instance that it believed any duty on its part to conduct a water test must 
be placed into written fom.  Therefore, the district court misapplied Idaho Code $ 54-2087(7), 
and the Respondents now ask this Court to do the same. 
Moreover, it must be further argued that the request for a full panel water test does not 
necessarily fall within the statutory definition of "an independent inspection of the property", 
like the Respondents wish us all to presume. Here, the request by the Blackmores went to the 
quality of the water in the well not the mechanical operation of the well itself. Interestingly, the 
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Respondents argued elsewhere that the language from the purchase and sale agreement referring 
to "well inspection" meant only the mechanical operation of the well. If that is the case, then an 
"independent inspection of the property" should carry the same meaning. Accordingly, the 
request for a full panel water test did not need to be reduced to writing as it does not fall under 
the definition of an "independent inspection of the property" contemplated by Idaho Code 8 54- 
2087(7). 
4. Respondents had Common Law Duties of Reasonable Skill and Care. 
Even if this Court does not find that Respondents owed duties to the Blackmores through 
Idaho Code 5 54-2087, the Court is not precluded from separately evaluating whether any duties 
existed at common law. See Rife, 127 Idaho at 846. By failing to recognize these common law 
duties as separate and distinct from any contractual or statutory duties (R., Vol. 2, p. 308), a 
difference that was argued to the district court by the Blackmores (R., Vol. 2, pp. 209-210), the 
district court erred in its determination that no duty between the parties existed. 
As argued to the district court, Respondents owed a general duty of reasonable care to the 
Blackmores to "use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which 
it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such 
injury." Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619. Nothing in the relationship or the situation between 
Respondents and the Blackmores abrogated or otherwise nullified this general duty of care. 
Again, the District Court did not give proper analysis to this issue, either in its decision on 
Summary Judgment (R., Vol. 2, p. 308) or in its decision on the Blackmores' Motion for 
Reconsideration (R., Vol. 2, pp. 376-378). Because Respondents were obligated at common law 
to exercise reasonable skill and care in their dealings with the Blackmores, summary judgment 
was inappropriate unless Respondents met their burden to show that no genuine issue of material 
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fact existed relative to any alleged breach of those duties. As argued in the following section, 
Respondents did not meet that burden. 
C. Breach. 
1. Whether Respondents Breached Their Duties is a Question of Fact not 
Appropriately Decided by the Court on Summary Judgment. 
Having established that the district court erred in its finding that no duty was owed by 
Respondents to the Blackmores, this brief will now turn to the question of whether such enor 
warrants reversal. As argued briefly above, once a legal duty has been confirmed, the question 
of whether that duty has been breached is a question of fact for the jury. Rife, 127 Idaho at 846. 
In order to withstand summary judgment, then, the Blackmores needed to show that there exist 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether Respondents breached their duties to the 
Blackmores. See Venters v. Sorrento Del., Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 108 P.3d 392 (2005). 
Furthermore, "[tlhe burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party." 
Id. at 250. Because much of the evidence submitted by the Blackmores below went 
unchallenged, genuine issues of material fact still exist as to whether Respondents breached, at a 
bare minimum, their statutory and common law duties to exercise reasonable care. 
2. The Unchallenged Allegations in the Blackmores' Verified Complaint 
Create Genuine Issues of Material Fact Appropriate for a Jury. 
Respondents have attempted to avoid the implications that come with the fact that they 
failed to adequately address the Blackmores' Verified Complaint during the proceedings on 
Summary Judgment by arguing that the case at bar is barred by the non-existence of any duty 
owed to the Blackmores. Respondents' Brief, p. 30. The Verified Complaint, however, 
indicates that Rich Blackmore made an express request to Respondent Thompson to have a full 
panel water test performed on the property. R., Vol. 1, p. 12. Respondents should not be able to 
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shield themselves with Idaho Code 5 54-2087(7), which indicates that all extra-statutory duties 
must be memorialized in writing, when their failure to reduce to writing the Blackmores' request 
for a full-scale water test could itself be considered a breach of LC. 5 54-2087(2) (duty to 
exercise reasonable skill and care). On this duty, considering the allegations in the Verified 
Complaint went undisputed in the proceedings below, there certainly exists a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
The Blackrnores, during oral argument on Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
very explicitly brought these issues to the attention of the District Court: 
And so what I would like to do, Your Honor, is frankly 
highlight those facts upon which we rely in defeat of these 
motions. And, Your Honor, I would say at the outset of that, that 
all of these facts upon which we rely are really set forth in the 
complaint which is veriJied by Mr. Blackmore. 
And, Your Honor, of course the facts in the complaint under 
the rules and the standards involved in summary judgment 
require that all of those facts be shed in the light most 
favorable to us, and the inferences that can be drawn from those 
facts are shed in the light most favorable to us. 
And it is those facts that we rely on that really were not 
discussed much by Re-Max, if at all. I think there was a reference 
or two discussed about this request for a full water panel test to be 
done. But not much was said, Your Honor, and those are ihe facts 
that if Re-Max really wanted to anchor its motion for summary 
judgment that they should accept as true, that they should shed in 
the light most reasonable and favorable to us, and all of the 
inferences that can be drawn from those facts to us. 
They didn't discuss those facts, so they weren't shed in the 
light favorable to us. 
So I do have to go back and clean up some of the facts upon 
which we truly rely here. 
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And the first one and the main one, Your Honor, is that after 
Mr. Thompson on behalf of Re-Max got involved in this 
transaction, there was an expressed request made from the 
Blackmores that Mr. Thompson would see to the conduct of a 
full panel water lest. That's pled in the complaint 
straightforward in the paragraphs relating to the common facts. 
The response that the Blackmores received from Mr. 
Thompson is also in the complaint, Your Honor. 
And Mr. Thompson told the Blackmores, Okay, I will see to it 
and we will have a full panel water test completed, and it will be 
done before closing. 
Tr., pp. 37:12-18, 38:s - 39:14 (emphasis added). The fact that the district court, both in its 
rulings on Summary Judgment and on Reconsideration, failed to give proper weight to the 
Verified Complaint (as more than mere allegations of a pleading), reveals the heart of the error 
that ultimately resulted in erroneous decisions at both Summary Judgment and on 
Reconsideration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The reality of this appeal is that the district court's order granting Summary Judgment, 
though somewhat obscured in the thirty-four page decision, was based on a finding that no duties 
were owed by Respondents to the Blackmores. For that reason, this reply brief has remained 
focused entirely on the first two of the fundamental elements of a negligence action in the state 
of Idaho - Duty and Breach. The question of whether the district court erred in striking affidavits 
submitted by the Blackmores becomes moot upon this Court's determination that duties were 
owed by Respondents to the Blackmores, and that the district court's justification for granting 
Summary Judgment was reversible error. Accordingly, the Blackmores will rely on the 
arguments and evidence previously submitted on the stricken affidavits. 
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For all the foregoing reasons, Appellants Blackmores respectfully maintain their request 
of this Court to reverse the District Court's order granting Summary Judgment in favor of 
Respondents ReMax Tri-Cities, L.L.C., Brad Thompson, and Sue Mio. 
a day of August, 2009. DATED this -
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
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